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Abstract I argue, contra Kaplan, that all English indexicals are shiftable. Starting
from a new puzzle involving epistemic conditionals, I propose a semantics that
accounts for embeddings of indexicals under non-metaphysical modals like might
or believe. The central idea is that indexicals are variables: epistemic and doxastic
modals are able to shift them by shifting the value of the assignment function. So all
epistemic and doxastic modals turn out to be Kaplanian monsters. I close by arguing
that the monstrous account has empirical advantages over the classical semantics
for attitudes in the Kaplan tradition, and in particular over the recent version of it
proposed by Percus and Sauerland.
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1 Introduction
On Kaplan’s (1989) classical theory of indexicality, the semantic values of indexicals
like I, you and now are identified with their referents.1 This theory leads to well-
known difficulties when indexicals occur in attitude and speech reports. Spotting a
man whose hair is enveloped in flames, I can warn him by saying
(1) I believe that you’re on fire.
Moreover, unless I also believe that my own hair is enveloped in flames, I can add
(2) I believe that I am not on fire.
(1) and (2) both have a true reading even if, unbeknownst to me, I’m looking into
a mirror and I am actually the man whose hair is on fire. This is puzzling: if you
and I in (1) and (2) denote the same individual, on Kaplan’s theory they have the
∗ For comments, questions, mentorship, and encouragement thanks to Fabrizio Cariani, Jennifer Carr,
Irene Heim, Dilip Ninan, Orin Percus, Alejandro Pérez Carballo, Agustín Rayo, Philippe Schlenker,
Yael Sharvit, Brad Skow, Bob Stalnaker, Andreas Stokke and to audiences at MIT, SPE 2009, the
AAP 2009 conference in Melbourne, SALT 20 and the Arché Semantics Group in St. Andrews.
1 Here and throughout the paper I use ‘semantic value’ to denote the kind of object that a lexical item
contributes to the truth-conditional computation.
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same semantic value. Then (1) and (2) should be heard as contradictory, or at least
as ascribing to me contradictory beliefs. Yet they are perfectly good reports of my
(consistent) attitudes.
Problems of this sort are familiar since Frege and have given rise to an extensive
literature in philosophy and semantics.2 One common assumption in this literature is
that the interpretation of indexicals can’t be affected by embeddings under believe.
This is a straightforward consequence of Kaplan’s theory. For Kaplan only context
can fix the semantic values of indexicals: operators that shift indexicals, which
Kaplan dubs ‘monsters’, are no part of the semantics of natural language (at least, of
natural languages like English). Interestingly, recent literature has shown that the
ban on monsters fails cross-linguistically.3 But this doesn’t help with the puzzle in
(1) and (2): in fact it remains virtually unquestioned that common English indexicals
like I, you or now are unshiftable, just as Kaplan had it. So you and I in (1) and
(2) pick out, as is customary, the addressee and the speaker, and our semantics for
attitude reports must work around this basic fact.
Or so it is thought. In this paper I argue that in fact there is a monstrous treatment
of indexicals which has empirical and conceptual advantages over traditional stories.
On this account all English indexicals work as variables; modal quantifiers with
epistemic flavor, such as must, might and believe, shift the assignment function and
thereby shift indexicals. So for example in a sentence like
(3) I might be lost in Main Library, Stanford.
I is a variable and its semantic value is fixed by an assignment determined by might.
As a result, I is associated with a range of epistemic counterparts of the speaker,
i.e. possible individuals who, for all the speaker knows, the speaker herself might
be. This theory should be preferred over its competitors, which involve heavier
stipulations or lead to overgeneration in a number of cases. If the foregoing is
correct, it is a partial argument that the semantics for attitude and speech reports is
monstrous, and that—pace Kaplan—English is replete with monsters.
I proceed as follows. In section 2, I introduce new data showing that the Frege-
style phenomenon generated by (1) and (2) can be reproduced with epistemic modals.
The new data is interesting because, much more than its counterpart involving
believe, it naturally points to a monstrous account. In section 3, I proceed to give a
2 In both cases the starting point for a formal treatment of the problem is Kaplan 1968; cf. also section
20 of Kaplan 1989.
3 More precisely, it has been argued that speech report verbs in some languages (Amharic, Zazaki,
Slave and perhaps, in a restricted fashion, even English) are able to produce shifted readings of
indexicals. For monstrous semantic accounts of all these languages, cf. Schlenker 1999, 2003; for the
Zazaki, Anand & Nevins 2004 and Anand 2006. An alternative account of the data is attempted by
von Stechow 2002 and von Stechow 2003. For useful summaries of the debate, cf. Schlenker 2004,
2008.
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monstrous theory which accommodates the data. Section 4 contains the argument
that this theory is superior to the traditional Kaplan-style account of attitude reports
(and in particular to one of the best and latest versions of it, that put forward by
Percus & Sauerland (2003)). In the conclusion, I point to directions for future
research.
2 The puzzle
2.1 Data
My starting observation is this: indexicals embedded under epistemic modalities can
have prima facie ‘shifty’ readings. Consider the following scenario:
Rudolf Lingens and Gustav Lauben are kidnapped. Lingens and
Lauben are amnesiacs: each of them knows that he is one of the two
kidnapped amnesiacs, but not which one. They will be subjected to
the following experiment. First, they will be anesthetized. Then a
coin will be tossed. If the outcome is tails, Lingens will be released
in Main Library, Stanford, and Lauben will be killed. If the outcome
is heads, Lauben will be released in Widener Library, Harvard, and
Lingens will be killed. Lingens and Lauben are informed of the plan
and the experiment is executed. Later, one of them wakes up in a
library. He says:
(4) If the coin landed tails, I am in Main Library, Stanford.
(5) If the coin landed heads, I am in Widener Library, Harvard.
Here are the data: (4) and (5) are both true (or at least appropriate) as uttered in the
scenario. The problem is that standard accounts of conditionals miss this prediction.
For illustration, take a basic version of Kratzer’s (1981) semantics for condition-
als. Conditionals are, as usual, modal statements where the if -clause plays the role
of a restrictor. The domain of quantification (modal base) is specified by a covert
variable the value of which is provided by context: for simplicity, here I assume that
the modal base defaults to the epistemic state of the speaker, i.e. the set of worlds
compatible with what the speaker knows.4 So the truth-conditions predicted for if p,
q are, schematically:
Jmust [if p] [q]Kc,g = true iff for all w′ compatible with what the
speaker knows in wc and such that w′ ∈ JpKc,g, w′ ∈ JqKc,g.
4 I should flag that this assumption is rather simplistic, and in fact is rejected by virtually everyone in
recent debates about epistemic modality. This is not important for my purposes, as the puzzle can be
reproduced on more sophisticated assumptions.
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Now, consider again the amnesiac scenario and suppose that Lingens is the speaker.
On the assumption that I invariably denotes the actual speaker, (5) gets truth-
conditions:
J(5)Kc,g = true iff for all w′ in Lingens’s epistemic state in wc such
that the coin landed heads in w′, Lingens is in Widener Library in w′.
But in all heads-worlds in Lingens’s epistemic state Lingens is not in Widener
Library—rather, he is dead. Hence (5) is wrongly predicted to be false. Conversely,
if Lauben is the speaker we get a wrong prediction for (4).
In short, then, the difficulty is this: whatever the context of utterance is (i.e.
whether we take Lingens or Lauben as the speaker), one of (4) and (5) is predicted
to be false. But both conditionals are true according to the data.
2.2 Generalizing the problem
The puzzle generalizes along two dimensions: it arises both for other indexicals and
for other modals. Let me look at other indexicals first. Here are examples involving
now and that:
You fall asleep at around noon, and you wake up hearing the clock in
your room chiming. You know it chimed once or twice, but you’re
not sure which. You say:
(6) If the clock chimed once, it is now one.
(7) If the clock chimed twice, it is now two.
A group of climbers has gotten lost in the mountains between France
and Italy. They are finally descending on one of the two sides, though
they don’t know which. One points to a city in the distance and says:
(8) If we are on the French side, that [pointing] is Lyon.
(9) If we are on the Italian side, that [pointing] is Turin.
The problem is analogous. All of (6)–(9) are true, but on a standard Kratzer semantics
one conditional in each pair turns out to be false, no matter what the actual context is.
So far as I can see, analogous puzzles can be constructed for all English indexicals.
What about other modals? Interestingly, results differ depending on the kind of
modality involved. Conditionals invoking metaphysical modality,5 such as counter-
factuals, behave exactly as predicted by a standard Kratzer semantics. Suppose that
5 By ‘metaphysical’ here I mean to pick out simply whatever modality will turn out to do work in
typical counterfactual conditionals.
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the amnesiac in the original scenario is recapitulating to himself his predicament.
Trying to describe the causal connections between possible outcomes of the coin
toss and amnesiacs waking up in libraries, he says
(10) If the coin had landed tails, I would have been in Main Library, Stanford.
(11) If the coin had landed heads, I would have been in Widener Library, Harvard.
A joint utterance of (10) and (11) is infelicitous, and in any case not on a par with a
joint utterance of (4) and (5). (One could reply “No, that’s wrong—it wouldn’t have
been you in both cases.”)
On the other hand, the data can be easily replicated with other non-metaphysical
modals. Following Hintikka (1962), I assume that attitude verbs also work as
quantifiers over possibilities. For example, believe is a universal quantifier over
worlds which model an agent’s doxastic alternatives—worlds that, for all the agent
believes, might be the actual world. Schematically:
Jx believes [that p]Kc,g = true iff for all w′ compatible with what x
believes, w′ ∈ JpKc,g
Now, suppose that, rather than (4) and (5), the amnesiac in the library scenario says:
(12) I believe that either the coin landed tails and I am in Main Library, Stanford,
or the coin landed heads and I am in Widener Library.
(12) presents us with basically the same problem as the (4)–(5) pair. There is no
individual that is going to be in Main in case of a tails outcome and in Widener in
case of a heads outcome. So, on a simple Hintikka-style semantics for believe, (12)
is predicted to be false no matter what the context is. For example, if the speaker is
Lingens, its truth-conditions are
J(12)Kc,g = true iff for all w′ compatible with what Lingens believes
in wc, either the coin landed tails and Lingens is in Main, or the coin
landed heads and Lingens is in Widener in w′.
In the remainder of the paper I use might, must, and believe as my running examples.
But the phenomenon can be reproduced at least for a large subclass of attitude
verbs: some examples are know, suppose, imagine, conjecture, dream. So the right
generalization seems to be that the phenomenon concerns the behavior of indexicals
in the scope of epistemic and doxastic modals in general.
Let me also mention two directions of generalization that I won’t explore for
reasons of space: on the one hand tense, on the other referential expressions other
than indexicals. I will come back to the latter briefly in the conclusion.
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2.3 Preview
The phenomenon spotted in this section clearly belongs to a larger family of Frege-
style issues concerning the interaction between indexicals and non-metaphysical
modals. But it deserves specific attention because, much more than other puzzles
in the vicinity, it suggests a natural solution. Consider again (4) and (5), repeated
below:
(13) If the coin landed tails, I am in Main Library, Stanford.
(14) If the coin landed heads, I am in Widener Library, Harvard.
It seems intuitive that the two conditionals work in this way: the if -clause selects
a subset of the worlds among those in the modal base, and the I occurring in the
consequent refers to the individual who is speaking in those worlds.
In the next section I propose an account that endorses and implements this
intuition: I in (4) and (5) works as as a variable that is bound by epistemic must.
Of course, the main challenge is to allow for this kind of monstrous behavior while
avoiding overgeneration. In particular, any plausible account should recapture the
standard data about unembedded indexicals, counterfactuals, etc., that motivated
Kaplan’s original account. This can be done, as I argue below.
3 A monstrous account
3.1 Theoretical background: counterparts and information states
Start from a general question: how should we evaluate indexicals embedded under
non-metaphysical modals like might and believe?
This question is the linguistic counterpart of a traditional question in philosophy
of mind. Epistemic and doxastic modals, recall, quantify over worlds modeling
information states of a subject: namely, what a subject knows, believes, etc. We
standardly talk of these information states as representing specific individuals: for
example, we can say that Lingens believes that I am lost in a university library. But
how am I individuated in Lingens’s information state? I.e., what makes Lingens’s
information state an information state about me, a real individual in the actual world?
Call this the problem of individuation.
The standard solution to the problem (coming from Hintikka (1969) and Lewis
(1983)) is this: I have a representative in each of Lingens’s belief worlds; Lingens
counts as knowing that I am lost in a university library in virtue of the fact that each
of my representatives in his knowledge worlds is lost in a university library.6 What
individuals are my representatives? In informal terms, individuals that resemble me
6 Why can’t I myself be my own representative in each of Lingens’s belief states? The problem is
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in certain relevant respects. In more formal terms: individuals that are counterparts
of me, where a relation of counterparthood is just a relation of similarity (cf. Lewis
1968, 1983): A is a counterpart of B under a certain respect just in case A and B are
sufficiently similar in that respect.
I suggest that the problem of evaluating indexicals under might or believe is
essentially a linguistic version of the problem of individuation. So it can be solved
with the same tools. Objects are individuated in an information state by individuating
a set of their representatives, one for each world in the information state. Similarly,
and in a slogan: indexicals embedded under might, believe and the like denote their
referents by denoting a set of their representatives. Out of metaphor, this means that
they work as bound variables and range over counterparts of the referents they pick
out in ordinary linguistic environments. So e.g. in
(15) Lingens believes that I am lost in a university library.
I is bound and ranges over counterparts of the actual speaker. Similarly, bound
occurrences of you will range over counterparts of the actual addressee; bound
occurrences of that (like those occurring in (8) and (9)) will range over counterparts
of the (n-th) object demonstrated; and so on.
I have talked about similarity and counterparts, but so far I haven’t specified what
notion of similarity we should use. For present purposes, it will be enough to import
an idea from Kaplan’s semantics for de re reports. I assume that a subject bears a
relation of acquaintance to the individuals he has attitudes about. Acquaintance is
supposed to be a kind of direct epistemic relation to an object, of which perception
is the paradigm example. Kaplan’s central idea is that acquaintance relations figure
in the content of a subject’s beliefs about objects. For example Lingens, having seen
me wander around the library, thinks of me as the man I saw wandering around
the library. So in each of his belief worlds there is a man he has seen wonder
around the library: just these men, who are my counterparts by acquaintance, are my
representatives in Lingens’s belief state. More generally, bound occurrences of I,
you, etc. range over counterparts by acquaintance of the actual speaker, addressee,
etc.7
that real-world identity is ill-suited to model the ways agents are represented throughout information
states. As Quine (1956) pointed out, I might enter Lingens’s beliefs under two guises: for example as
that man in front of him, next to the stack of semantics books, and that man reflected in the mirror
over there, who (for all Lingens can see) might or might not be next to the stack of semantics books.
If we invariably used myself as my own representative throughout Lingens’s doxastic state we should
say that Lingens has inconsistent beliefs, since in some alternatives I would both be and not be next
to the stack of semantics books. But Lingens’s beliefs are not contradictory—he’s just ignorant about
certain matters of fact. (For extended discussion of this problem, see Lewis 1983 and Ninan 2008)
7 For more details about acquaintance see, among others, Lewis 1979. I should flag that Kaplan’s
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3.2 Semantics: overview
The semantics is based on three main innovations on classical theories. First,
indexicals are variables and their anchoring to the context is determined by extra-
semantic constraints on the choice of the assignment. Second, modals like might
and believe quantify not simply over worlds, but rather over pairs of an assignment
and a world. Third, these modals shift the value of the assignment and as a result
shift indexicals. Let me present each of these points informally before turning to the
formal system.
First, indexicals are turned into simple variables. By ‘simple’ I mean that their
lexical entries contain no reference to the context, not even in a presupposition.
In a slogan, I is semantically analogous to he (at least with respect to its person
features). The only difference is that indexicals are given referents not via the
ordinary assignment, but by a second dedicated assignment, which I denote with ‘a’.
The connection between indexicals and context is not part of the semantics proper,
but takes place at the level of metasemantics, i.e. at the stage at which the dedicated
assignment is selected. So nothing in the semantics of I tells us that it must refer to
the speaker, but it is a constraint on the choice of a that I be invariably sent to the
speaker.
Second, modals are turned into more powerful quantifiers. might, believe and
the like quantify not simply over worlds, but rather over pairs of assignments
(i.e. functions from indices to sequences of individuals), and centered worlds. This
move is not new. It is a natural generalization of our standard semantics for de se
reports and variants of it appear frequently in the literature on de re reports.8
So far, then, my account of modals looks similar to other proposals in the
literature. The innovation consists in allowing the modal to shift indexicals by
shifting the assignment a. In the new system might, believe and the like shift the
value of the assignment a, forcing the evaluation of the embedded clause at the
alternative assignments they quantify over. Schematically:
Jx believes that [φ ]Kc,g,a = for all 〈a′, w′〉 compatible with x’s beliefs
at wc, JφKc,g,a′(w′)
idea of using acquaintance for the semantics of de re attitudes is subject to a number of objections:
see e.g. Ninan 2008, especially chapters 2 and 3. I am aware of this, and suspect that ultimately
we should switch to a better notion. But the issue of what counterpart relation is in place, although
important, seems orthogonal to my main point here. So it seems easier to go with Kaplan on this
point.
8 Typical examples are accounts derived from Kaplan 1968: cf. among others Cresswell & von
Stechow 1982 and Ninan 2008. Interestingly, Cumming 2008 has attitude verbs quantify over pairs
of assignments and worlds and bind names. There are obvious similarities between Cumming’s
semantics and mine, as well as important differences. (For example the system I suggest, unlike his,
enforces obligatory shift of the assignment.)
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This requires that the clausal arguments of modals be not propositions, but rather
functions of higher type, i.e. functions from (again) an assignment and a centered
world to a truth-value. We get these arguments by introducing a binder on the
assignment. For example, in (15) (repeated below)
(16) Lingens believes that I am lost in a university library.
the clausal argument of believe is
λa′.JI am lost in a university libraryKc,g,a′
It should be clear how, on the semantics just sketched, might and believe are able to
affect the semantic values of indexicals. The idea is simple: they shift indexicals by
shifting the assignment on which their semantic values depend.
Notice an interesting formal analogy between assignment-shifting modals and
intensional operators in intensional systems. Both manipulate a metalanguage
parameter: an assignment in the former case, and the world or time parameter in the
latter. To visualize the point, consider a schematic intensional semantics for must:
Jmust [φ ]Kc,w,g = for all accessible w′, JφKc,w′,g
One feature of the shift produced in this way is that it is obligatory. The embedded
clause must be evaluated at the shifted parameter (at least if no other operators are
present). This point will be important for the comparison between the monstrous
theory and more classical theories.
So much for an overview. Now let me introduce the system.
3.3 Semantics: formal details
In line with recent literature (see, for example, Schlenker 2003), I assume a fully
extensional system, which involves object language quantification over worlds. The
basic denotations of clauses are centered propositions, namely functions from worlds
and individuals to truth-values. For example:
JRalph loves OrtcuttKc,g,a = λw. λx. Ralph loves Ortcutt in w
For shorthand, I’m going to use ‘i’ for a variable over centered worlds as well as for
the semantic type of centered worlds.
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3.3.1 Indexicals
Indexicals are variables with a special diacritic [+c∗].9 Their semantics is analogous
to the semantics of ordinary variables of the corresponding types, with the only
difference that they are handled by the new assignment a. For example:
JIKc,g,a = Jx1[+c∗]Kc,g,a = a(1[+c∗])JyouKc,g,a = Jx5[+c∗]Kc,g,a = a(5[+c∗])
This makes indexicals bindable, but poses the problem of recapturing the connection
between their free occurrences and the context of utterance. How to do this?
I suggest that this connection is independent of the compositional part of the
semantics. Rather, it is captured at the level that Kaplan calls ‘metasemantics’, i.e. at
the level at which the context of utterance determines an assignment. For present
purposes, I simply assume the existence of a constraint on the selection of the special
assignment a. This constraint rules out as inadmissible assignments which send
indexicals into the wrong referents. I.e.,
An assignment a is admissible in c just in case a(1[+c∗]) = the
speaker of c, a(5[+c∗]) = the addressee of c, etc.
Admittedly this account is somewhat stipulative: it would be preferable to provide
some independent evidence for the metasemantic story. I am not in the position to
do this here. On the upside, this is the only stipulative element I need.
3.3.2 Composition rules
Ordinary clauses denote centered propositions; at the same time, modals require
a clausal argument of higher type. So there is systematic type mismatch between
modals and their clausal arguments. This mismatch is fixed via a new composition
rule which tells us to perform lambda-abstraction on the assignment a:
Monstrous Functional Application (MFA)
If α is a branching node and {β ,γ} the set of its daughters, then
for any context c and assignment g, if Jβ Kc,g,a is a function whose
domain contains λa′. JγKc,g,a′ , then JαKc,g,a = Jβ Kc,g,a(λa′. JγKc,g,a′).
Notice that this is a second parallel between this system and intensional systems. In-
tensional systems normally contain an extra composition rule, Intensional Functional
9 The semantics for indexicals is indebted to an idea found in Schlenker 2008, esp. pages 25–6.
Schlenker attributes the crucial suggestion to Ede Zimmermann.
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Application (see Heim & Kratzer 1998), which is also triggered by type mismatch
between operators and their clausal argument.
3.3.3 Modals
My starting point is the semantics for epistemic and doxastic modals that is common
currency in the literature on de se reports (see, among others, Lewis 1979, Chierchia
1989, Anand 2006). Modals are universal quantifiers over a contextually supplied
set of centered worlds:
JmustKc,g = λ p〈i,t〉. λM〈i,〈i,t〉〉. λw. ∀i′: i′ ∈ ((M)(i)), p(i′) = 1
Monstrous modals are different in three respects. I already mentioned two:
• they quantify over pairs of assignments and centered worlds;
• their clausal argument is, correspondingly, a function from assignment-
centered world pairs to truth-values.
To these I add a third:
• epistemic and doxastic modals have an extra argument, which is filled by a
variable ranging over sequences of counterpart functions.
This extra argument serves the purpose of determining the assignment-centered
world pairs that the modal quantifies over. These counterpart functions (type 〈es, e〉)
specify a way in which the subject of the epistemic state is acquainted with elements
of the context. So f1 specifies the way in which she’s acquainted with the speaker,
f2 the way in which she’s acquainted with the addressee, fi the way in which she’s
acquainted with the i-th demonstratum, etc. We use them to determine sequences of
individuals; in turn, these sequences are used to determine an assignment.
Here are the details. We start from a sequence 〈 f1, f2, . . . 〉. We plug each
centered world in the modal base into all the functions in the sequence. This gives
us sequences of possible individuals:
〈 f1(ik), f2(ik), . . . , fn(ik)〉
〈 f1(il), f2(il), . . . , fn(il)〉
. . .
Notice that the individuals in each sequence are the counterparts of speaker, ad-
dressee, etc. in a determinate centered world. It is easy to recover an assignment
function, once we have each of these sequences. We just take a function which maps
the n-th index into the individual determined by the n-th counterpart function:
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1[+c∗] −→ f1(ik)
2[+c∗] −→ f2(ik)
. . .
n[+c∗] −→ fn(ik)
Now, let ak be the assignment determined in this way by using centered world ik.
The assignment-centered world pairs that a modal quantifies over will be all the
pairs 〈ak, ik〉, where ik is a world in the modal base. For shorthand, I will say that an
assignment-centered world pair is compatible with a modal base M and a sequence
of counterpart functions 〈 f1, f2, . . . 〉 iff it can be generated from that modal base
and that sequence in the way described.
All this is encoded in the lexical entry of modals. In essence, modals do two
things:
• First, they ‘check’ that the counterpart functions provided by context are the
right ones. I.e., they check that f1, if defined,10 does in fact specify the way
that the subject is acquainted with the speaker, f2, if defined, does specify
the way the subject is acquainted with the hearer, etc.
• Second, they quantify over the pairs that are generated in the way described.
Here is the entry for epistemic must (using A as a type for assignments):
JmustKc,g,a = λχ〈A,〈i,t〉〉. λ 〈 f1, f2, . . .〉. λM〈i,〈i,t〉〉. λ i.
( f1)(i) = (if def.) a(x1[+c∗]), ( f2)(i) = (if def.) a(x2[+c∗]) . . .
and ∀〈a′, i′〉 compatible with M(i) and 〈 f1, f2, . . .〉, χ(a′)(i′) = 1
And here is the entry for believe:
JbelieveKc,g,a = λχ〈A,〈i,t〉〉. λ 〈 f1, f2, . . .〉. λM〈i,〈i,t〉〉. λx. λ i.
( f1)(〈w,x〉) = (if def.) a(x1[+c∗]), ( f2)(〈w,x〉) = (if def.) a(x2[+c∗])
. . .
and ∀〈a′, i′〉 compatible with what x believes and 〈 f1, f2, . . .〉,
χ(a′)(i′) = 1
10 Why the definedness condition? In most cases, the subject of the relevant information state won’t
have a way of identifying all elements of the context of utterance. In this case I assume that the
context will provide an undefined function for that object. Having undefined functions in the sequence
doesn’t make a difference unless the function does actual work in fixing the range of an indexical
appearing in the clause.
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Here is a sample derivation. Take
(17) I must be in Main Library, Stanford.
which I assume has LF
(18) λ i0. must [λ i1. x1[+c∗] be in Main Library, Stanford i1] (〈 f1, f2, . . .〉)
(M〈i,〈i,t〉〉) i0
Here is the computation (using ‘F’ as a variable over sequences of counterpart
functions):
Jλ i0. must [λ i1. x1[+c∗] be in Main Library, Stanford i1](F) (M) i0Kc,g,a =
(by FA and abstraction rules)
λ i′. [Jmust [λ i1. x1[+c∗] be in Main Library, Stanford i1]Kc,g[i0→i′],a (g(F)) (g(M))
i′] = (by MFA)
λ i′. [JmustKc,g[i0→i′],a (λa′. J[λ i1. x1[+c∗] be inMain Library, Stanford i1]Kc,g[i0→i′],a′)
(g(F)) (g(M)) i′] =
(computing the denotation of the clause)
λ i′. [JmustKc,g[i0→i′],a (λa′. [λ i′′. [ a′(1[+c∗]) is in Main Library, Stanford in i′′]])
(g(F)) (g(M)) i′] =
(by the entry for must)
λ i′. [[λχ . λ 〈 f1, f2, . . .〉. λM. λ i. ( f1)(i) = (if defined) a(x1[+c∗]), ( f2)(i) = (if
defined) a(x2[+c∗]) . . .
and ∀〈a∗, i∗〉 compatible with M(i) and 〈 f1, f2, . . .〉, χ(a∗)(i∗) = 1]
(λa′. [λ i′′. [ a′(1[+c∗]) is in Main Library, Stanford in i′′]]) (g(F)) (g(M)) i′] =
(by the definition of λ -notation)
λ i′. [[λ 〈 f1, f2, . . .〉. λM. λ i. ( f1)(i) = (if defined) a(x1[+c∗]), ( f2)(i) = (if defined)
a(x2[+c∗]) . . . and ∀〈a∗, i∗〉 compatible with M(i) and 〈 f1, f2, . . .〉, a∗(1[+c∗])) is
in Main Library, Stanford in i∗] g(F) (g(M)) i′] = (by the definition of λ -notation
again)
λ i′. [(g( f1))(i′) = (if defined) a(x1[+c∗]) (g( f2))(i) = (if defined) a(x2[+c∗]) . . . and
∀〈a∗, i∗〉 compatible with (g(M))(i′) and g(F), a∗(1[+c∗])) is in Main Library, Stan-
ford in i∗] = (fixing the value of g and a, and simplifying)
λ i′. [(g( f1))(i′), if defined, is the speaker and for all 〈a∗, i∗〉 compatible with what
the speaker knows at i′ and the sequence of counterpart functions g(F), a∗(1[+c∗]))
is in Main Library, Stanford in i∗]
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3.4 The puzzle, solved
Here are the (slightly simplified) truth conditions assigned to (4) and (5):
J(4)Kc,g,a = true iff (g( f1))(ic) = the speaker of c and for all i′ compatible
with what the speaker knows at ic s.t. the coin landed tails in i′, the g( f1)-
counterpart of the speaker in i′ is in Main Library, Stanford in i′.J(5)Kc,g,a = true iff (g( f1))(ic) = the speaker of c and for all i′ compatible
with what the speaker knows at ic s.t. the coin landed heads in i′, the g( f1)-
counterpart of the speaker in i′ is in Widener Library, Harvard in i′.
Provided that the context supplies an appropriate individual concept, this predicts
that both (4) and (5) are true, exactly as we want. Although I won’t go through
that, it should be clear that the semantics is equipped also to handle more traditional
puzzles, like the one generated by (1) and (2).
4 The comparison with a classical account
4.1 Kaplan-style semantics for the de re
If the foregoing is right, there is a monstrous semantics for English indexicals that
accounts for their interaction with might, believe and the like. But is it better than
alternatives? In this section I set up a comparison between the monstrous theory and
what I take to be its main competitor, i.e. the semantics for attitude reports deriving
from Kaplan 1968. I focus on a recent version of Kaplan’s semantics proposed by
Percus & Sauerland (2003) (see also Percus 2010). I argue that the monstrous theory
has an empirical advantage: the Kaplan-style theory, but not the monstrous theory,
overgenerates systematically when attitude reports are embedded in attitude reports.
The monstrous theory and the Kaplan-style theory share two main features.
First, they both employ relations of counterparthood by acquaintance. Second, the
Kaplan-style theory, somewhat similarly to the monstrous theory, treats believe as
a quantifier over pairs of sequences of individuals and worlds. As a result, the
truth-conditions predicted by the two are, at least for a wide range of cases, very
close. So the difference lies mostly in the compositional implementation.
As is well-known, most versions of the Kaplan-style theory rely on important
stipulations just at the compositional level. (For example, the one presented by
Cresswell & von Stechow (1982) is non-compositional, and the one used by Heim
(1994) and Anand (2006) must stipulate a kind of otherwise unattested syntactic
movement.) Percus and Sauerland’s version is smoother and avoids stipulations of
this kind, hence it seems a good candidate for setting up a comparison.
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4.2 Percus and Sauerland’s semantics for attitude reports
The central notion of Percus and Sauerland’s (henceforth, P&S) semantics is that
of a concept generator. Concept generators are functions matching objects with
counterpart functions (type 〈e, ie〉). The basic idea is that indexicals feed their
semantic values into concept generators; the latter produce counterpart functions,
which in turn generate descriptive truth-conditions for the sentence.
Here is how this is implemented. The syntax contains variables Gi ranging
over concept generators, as well as abstractors over these variables. The clausal
arguments of attitude verbs are just functions from concept generators to centered
worlds propositions. For example, the denotation of the that-clause in (1) (repeated
below) is given in (20)
(19) I believe that you are on fire.
(20) λG0. λ i1. [((G0(the addressee of c))(i1)) (is on fire)](i1)
The denotation of believe involves reference to acquaintance-based concept gen-
erators: intuitively, these are simply concept generators that match objects with
concepts that capture relations of acquaintance.11 P&S’s idea is that believe existen-
tially quantifies over concept generators. Here is its denotation:
JbelieveKc,g = λφ〈〈e,ie〉,〈i,t〉〉. λxe. λ i: There is some acquaintance-
based concept generator G for x in i s.t. ∀i′∈DOXx in i, (φ(G))(i′)= 1
This generates plausible truth-conditions for (1):
J(1)Kc,g = true iff there is some acquaintance-based concept generator
G for the speaker of c in ic s.t. ∀i′ compatible with what the speaker
of c believes, ((the addressee of c)(G))(i′) is on fire in i′.
Even though P&S don’t investigate epistemic modals, it is straightforward how to
extend the proposal. We can use the following lexical entry for must:
11 Here is the definition:
A function G of type 〈e, ie〉 is an acquaintance-based concept generator for x at
centered world i iff:
(i) Dom(G) = {y: x is acquainted with y at i}
(ii) For all y in Dom(G), there is some acquaintance relation R s.t.
– x bears R uniquely to y in i, and
– for all centered worlds i′ in x’s doxastic set at i, the center of i′ bears R
to G(y)(i′) in i′.
303
Paolo Santorio
JmustKc,g = λφ〈〈e,ie〉,〈i,t〉〉. λM〈i,it〉. λ i: There is some acquaintance-
based concept generator G for the individual at i s.t. ∀i′∈M(i) in i,
(φ(G))(i′) = 1
This solves our puzzle. As an example, here are the truth-conditions of (4):
J(4)Kc,g = true iff there is some acquaintance-based concept generator
G for the speaker of c in ic s.t. ∀i′ compatible with what the speaker
knows at ic and s.t. the coin landed tails in i′, ((the speaker of c)(G))(i′)
is in Main Library, Stanford in i′.
4.3 The argument from embedded reports
Despite their similarities, P&S’s theory and the monstrous theory diverge in an
important respect. P&S’s theory introduces counterpart functions via variables that
appear in the clausal complements of modals. By contrast, on the monstrous theory
counterpart functions are arguments of the modal itself. This difference has an
interesting consequence. Consider a sentence with two doxastic modals, like
(21) John believes that I believe that you are on fire.
The monstrous theory predicts that the range of a shifted indexical is invariably
fixed by the closest modal. For example, the range of you in (21) must be fixed by
the lower believe. By contrast P&S’s theory is more flexible: the range of you will
depend on the coindexing patterns of concept generator variables.
The argument I’m about to give is based just on this difference. P&S’s theory
predicts more readings than the monstrous theory. But these readings are unavailable,
so P&S’s theory overgenerates while the monstrous theory is empirically adequate.
In essence, the kind of contrast at stake is the contrast between an extensional and
an intensional treatment of a parameter—in this case, counterpart functions. P&S’s
theory handles them via variables in the clause, while the monstrous theory handles
them via an operator that affects everything falling in its scope (i.e., the monstrous
modal). The argument establishes that the extensional theory overgenerates and the
operator theory is correct.
Start by considering (21). P&S’s theory assigns to it this LF:
λ i0. John believes that
λG0. λ i1. (G0(I))(i1) believe that
λG1. λ i2. ((Gk(you))(i2)) (are on fire)(i2)
(i1)(i0)
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The crucial issue is the index of the underlined variable. That variable may have
index 0: i.e. it may be coindexed with the higher abstractor. If this is the case (21) gets
(roughly) the following truth-conditions: it is true iff (a) there is some acquaintance-
based way in which John thinks of the speaker (say, the F), (b) according to John’s
beliefs, the F believes that the individual that the F thinks of in the way in which John
thinks of the hearer is on fire. And this is obviously wrong. To see this, consider the
following scenario:
John has seen you, an amnesiac, wander around Main Library, Stan-
ford, and has come to think of you as the individual I saw wander
around Main Library, Stanford. He also believes that I have seen
some other amnesiac, different from you, wander around the library,
that I’ve come to think of him under the description that I would spec-
ify as the individual I saw wander around Main Library, Stanford
and that I believe that he is on fire.
(21) is predicted to be true in the scenario described. But this is obviously wrong:
my having beliefs that involve a counterpart function that is also involved in John’s
beliefs is not enough to give me a belief about you.
By contrast, the monstrous semantics handles (21) quite easily. Here is the LF of
(21):
John believes that
[λ i1. I believe that
[λ i2. you are on fire (i2)]
(〈 f ′1, f ′2, . . . 〉)(M1)(i1)](〈 f1, f2, . . . 〉)(M0)(i0)
What the semantics does is shift the assignment twice over. So you will be evaluated
at the assignments quantified over by the lower believe. Schematically:
J(21)Kc,g,a = for all 〈a′, i′〉 compatible with John’s beliefs at ic, for all
〈a′′, i′′〉 compatible with the beliefs of a′(1[+c∗]) at i′, Jyou are on
fireKc,g,a′′(i′′)
The truth-conditions will be:
J(21)Kc,g,a = true iff John is acquainted in the way specified by g( f1)
with the actual speaker in wc, and for all i′ compatible with John’s
beliefs at ic, the g( f1)-counterpart of the speaker in i′ is acquainted in
the way specified by g( f ′2) with the the g( f2)-counterpart of the ad-
dressee in i′ and for all i′′ compatible with what the g( f1)-counterpart
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of the speaker in i′ believes in i′, the g( f ′2)-counterpart of the ad-
dressee in i′′ is on fire in i′′.
which seems correct. So the monstrous theory avoids overgeneration.12
5 Conclusion
I have argued that there is a monstrous theory that accounts smoothly for the inter-
action between indexicals and non-metaphysical modalities. This theory is well-
equipped to handle traditional puzzles in the semantics for belief, as well as a new
12 Percus (p.c.) suggests a reply on behalf of the P&S theory. We can assume that a concept generator
for an individual x at a world w only yields counterpart functions that are defined at the doxastic
alternatives of x at w. If we do this, then (21) ends up having undefined truth-conditions when the
lower variable is coindexed with the higher abstractor. This is because, assuming that John and the
speaker have doxastic sets that are at least partially disjoint, (Gk(the addressee of c)) is undefined for
some i compatible with John’s beliefs. So the problematic reading is blocked.
The reply is that one can construct similar examples where the two believers have coinciding
belief states. In these cases the problematic reading is not blocked, and the theory still yields a wrong
prediction. Here is one example of this kind:
Lingens and Lauben are amnesiacs in two different though qualitatively identical
libraries. Adjust things in a way that their doxastic states (i.e. the sets of centered
worlds that are compatible with their respective beliefs) are completely identical:
so e.g. assume that they have identical subjective experiences. Moreover, make it
the case that they’re aware that they are in qualitatively indistinguishable situations.
(Say, the experimenters tell them that this is the case.) And now, suppose that I am
in Lingens’s library, that Lingens sees me, and comes to think of me as the man I
saw in the library. And suppose that B.J. Ortcutt (a qualitative duplicate of me)
is in Lauben’s library, that Lauben sees him, and comes to think of him under the
concept the man I saw in the library. And now consider the sentence
(22) Lingens believes that Laubeni believes that I am in hisi same library.
The case is extremely contrived, but the judgment is still clear. According to Lingens’s beliefs,
Lauben has never even seen me, hence he certainly does not believe I am in his same library. So (22)
is false. But P&S predict that it has a true reading. The relevant LF is, again, the one where the lower
variable over concept generators is coindexed with the higher abstractor:
Lingens believes that
λG0. λ i1. (G0(Lauben j))(i1) believe that
λG1. λ i2. ((G0(I))(i2)) (am in his j same library)(i2)
(i1)(i0)
The point is the same as for (21). Both Lingens and Lauben think of someone (respectively, me and
Ortcutt) in the way specified by the function λw. λx. the y that x saw in the library. And, as Lingens
knows, Lauben thinks, of the individual that he identifies in the same way in which Lingens identifies
me, that he’s in his same library. On the P&S theory, this is enough to give (22) a true reading.
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puzzle that was my starting data. Arguably, this theory is also superior overall to its
main competitor, Kaplan-style semantics for attitude reports.
Should we then reject Kaplan-style semantics in favor of the monstrous theory?
Not yet. The argument I’ve given is very partial. At best, I’ve shown how to give a
monstrous theory that handles the behavior of indexicals under non-metaphysical
modals. But Kaplan-style semantics has a much broader coverage: it handles the be-
havior of all referential expressions in modal environments, as well as quantification
into these environments. So a full comparison must wait until the present account is
extended to handle names, de re occurrences of descriptions, and quantification in
modal contexts. But what I’ve said should be enough to establish that the monstrous
option deserves to be taken seriously.
Let me close by pointing to three topics that deserve further research: the bearing
of the foregoing on the semantics of metaphysical modals; the interaction between
epistemic modals and attitude verbs on the monstrous picture; the existence of
independent evidence for the metasemantic account of free indexicals.
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